A major result concerning temporal logics is Kamp's Theorem which states that the pair of modalities ''until'' and ''since'' is expressively complete for the first-order fragment of the monadic logic over the linear-time canonical model of naturals.
Introduction
Various temporal logics have been proposed for reasoning about the so-called ''reactive'' systems, computer hardware or software systems which exhibit (potentially) a non-terminating and a non-deterministic behavior. A system of this kind is typically represented by (potentially) infinite sequences of computation states through which it may evolve, where we associate with each state the set of atomic propositions which are true in that state, along with the possible next state transitions to which it may evolve. Thus, its behavior is denoted by a (potentially) infinite rooted tree, with the initial state of the system represented by the root of the tree.
Temporal Logic (TL) introduced to Computer Science by Pnueli in [20] is a convenient framework for the specification properties of ''reactive'' systems. This made temporal logics a popular subject in the Computer Science community and it has enjoyed an extensive research in the last 30 years. In temporal logic the relevant properties of the system are described by atomic propositions that hold at some points in time, but not at others. More complex properties are described by the formulae built from the atoms using Boolean connectives and Modalities (temporal connectives): a k-place modality C transforms statements ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k on points possibly other than the given point t 0 to a statement C (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) on the point t 0 . The rule that specifies when the statement C (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) is true for the given point is called a Truth Table. The choice of the particular modalities with their truth tables determines the different temporal logics. A Temporal Logic with modalities M 1 , . . . , M k is denoted by TL(M 1 , . . . , M k ).
The most basic modality is the one-place modality FX saying: ''X holds some time in the future''. Its truth table is usually formalized by ϕ F (t 0 , X ) ≡ (∃t > t 0 )t ∈ X . This is a formula of the Monadic Logic of Order (MLO). The Monadic Logic of Order is a fundamental formalism in Mathematical Logic. Its formulae are built using atomic propositions t ∈ X , atomic relations between elements t 1 = t 2 , t 1 < t 2 , Boolean connectives, first-order quantifiers ∃t and ∀t, and second-order (set) quantifiers ∃X and ∀X. Nearly all the modalities used in the literature have their truth tables defined in MLO, and as a result every formula of a temporal logic translates directly into an equivalent formula of MLO. Therefore, the different temporal logics may be considered as a convenient way to use fragments of MLO. MLO can also serve as a yardstick by which to check the strength of the temporal logic chosen: a temporal logic is expressively complete for a fragment L of MLO if every formula of L with a single free variable t 0 is equivalent to a temporal formula.
Actually, the notion of expressive completeness refers to a temporal logic and to a model (or a class of models) since the question whether two formulae are equivalent depends on the domain over which they are evaluated. Any (partially) ordered set with monadic predicates is a model for TL and MLO, but the main, canonical, linear-time intended models are the non-negative integers N, < for discrete time and the non-negative reals R + , < for continuous time.
A major result concerning TL is Kamp's theorem [16, 12, 11] , which states that the pair of modalities ''X until Y '' and ''X since Y '' is expressively complete for the first-order fragment of MLO over the above two linear-time canonical models.
Kamp's theorem is about temporal logics over linear structures, called linear-time logics, but many popular temporal logics, called branching-time logics [17, 9] , view time as a tree-like set of time points, and are correspondingly interpreted over tree-like partially ordered structures.
Many branching-time logics have been proposed, starting with [17, 2, 3, 21, 4, 6, 8, 9, 29] . The basic modalities of these logics are obtained by combining a path quantifier ''E'' or ''A'' with a formula in TL(U) (TL(U) is the temporal logic with the until modality U). The formula Eφ (respectively Aφ) holds at time point t 0 if for some path (respectively, for every path) π starting at t 0 the TL(U) formula φ holds along π . For example, a commonly used branching-time logic is CTL [3, 5] , based on the two binary modalities EU and AU.
Two extensions of CTL, namely ECTL and ECTL + , have been proposed to deal with fairness properties [9] . ECTL is TL(EU, AU, EF ∞ ) where F ∞ p reads ''p holds infinitely often in the future''. ECTL + is more expressive since it allows Eφ for any formula φ with no nested modalities in TL(U, F ∞ ). The basic modalities of CTL and ECTL are unary or binary; however, the basic modalities of ECTL + have arbitrary arities. Finally, the logic CTL * , from [9] , is obtained by considering an infinite set of modalities: Eφ for any formula φ in TL(U).
The expressive power of the first-order MLO over the trees is very limited. For instance, a very basic property ''along all futures, eventually p'' (that is, ''p is inevitable'') is not expressible in the first-order MLO. However all the modalities of the above logics have their truth tables defined in the second-order MLO.
Our main result states that in contrast to the Kamp theorem, for every n there is a modality of arity n (definable by an MLO formula) which is not equivalent over trees to any temporal logic formula which uses modalities of arity less than n.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the basic definitions about monadic logic of order and its fragments. In Section 3 we review the basic definitions about temporal logics and modalities. In Section 4 we state our results. Section 5 contains proofs. Section 6 compares our results with related works and states some open problems.
Monadic logic of order
Monadic logic of order is a fundamental formalism in mathematical logic and in the theory of computation. In this section we recall the basic definitions about monadic logic of order; we also define its important fragments.
Notations
We use standard notations and abbreviations. A (relational) signature is given by a set of relational symbols and their arity. Let A be a structure for a signature τ . We use |A| for the universe of A and R A for the interpretation of the relational symbol R in A. Whenever there is no confusion we will also use A for the universe of A; sometimes, we use ''a ∈ A'' instead of ''a ∈ |A|'' and '' a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ R'' instead of '' a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ R A ''. For a structure A over a signature τ = {. . . , R i , . . . } we use notations |A|, . . . , R A i , . . . which we also abbreviated to |A|, . . . , R i , . . . .
Syntax
The syntax of the second-order Monadic Logic of Order (MLO) has in its vocabulary individual first-order variables
. . , and set constants (monadic predicate's names).
The atomic formulae are of the form x 1 = x 2 , x 1 < x 2 , x ∈ X and x ∈ P, where x i (respectively, X and P) ranges over individual variables (respectively, set variables and monadic predicate's names). Formulae are built up from the atomic formulae using the propositional connectives ∧ and ¬, and the quantifiers ∃x and ∃X. We denote by FOMLO the subset of first-order formulae of MLO, i.e., formulae where the second-order quantifier ∃X does not occur. Note that the formulae of this fragment may contain free set variables.
We shall write φ(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k , X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m ) to indicate that the free variables of φ are among
The quantifier-depth of a formula φ, denoted by qd(φ), is defined as usual: qd(φ) = 0 for atomic formulae; qd(φ ∧ φ ) = max(qd(φ), qd(φ )); qd(¬φ) = qd(φ); and qd(∃xφ) = qd(∃X φ) = 1 + qd(φ).
Semantics
The semantics of MLO follows classical lines. A structure for MLO is a tuple M = |M|, <, P 1 , . . . , P n , . . . where < is a partial order over a set |M| and P 1 , . . . , P n , . . . ⊆ |M| are monadic predicates. If M is such a structure, s 1 , . . . , s m ∈ |M| are elements of M and S 1 , . . . , S n ⊆ |M| are sets of elements, we write
if the formula φ is satisfied in the structure M with x i interpreted as s i (i = 1, . . . , m) and X j interpreted as S j (j = 1, . . . , n).
The definition is a standard one, so we omit it.
We will be mainly interested in partial orders which are tree orders.
T is a binary relation such that
(1) The set |T | is partially ordered by < T .
(2) There is a unique < T minimal element.
(3) For every element a ∈ |T | the set {b ∈ |T | : b < T a} is finite and <
T is a linear order on this set. 
∩|T ≥s | × |T ≥s |.
A path through T starting at s 1 ∈ |T | is a maximal linearly ordered sequence of successive nodes π = s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . through the tree. A path π through T induces a substructure, denoted by T π ; the set of nodes of T π is {s 1 , s 2 , . . . }, s is labelled by P i in T π iff s is labelled by P i in T , and s is an ancestor of s in T π iff s ≤ T s .
Future formula

Definition 2.1 (Future Formula).
A formula φ(x 0 , X 1 , . . . , X k ) of MLO with one free first-order variable x 0 is a future formula if for every tree T and node s ∈ |T |, and for all subsets S 1 , . . . , S k of |T |, the following holds:
where, for i = 1, . . . , k, S i is the restriction of S i to |T ≥s |.
In other words, a future formula is a formula with one free individual variable x 0 whose value depends only on nodes higher than x 0 in the tree. Observe that this is a semantic notion, not a syntactic one.
Remark 2.2 (Syntactical Conditions for the Property to be a Future Formula).
Let φ(X 1 , . . . , X k ) be a formula without free first-order variable. Letφ be obtained from φ by relativizing all first-order quantifiers to the elements greater than or equal to x 0 , i.e., when ''∃x. . . . '' and ''∀x. . . . '' are replaced by ''∃x( x ≥ x 0 ∧ · · · )'' and by ''∀x(x ≥ x 0 → · · · )'', respectively. Note that the formulaφ obtained in such a way is always a future formula. Moreover, any ψ(x 0 ) is a future formula if and only if it is equivalent to a formulaφ(x 0 ) with all quantifiers relativized to the elements greater than or equal to x 0 .
Temporal logics
In this section, we recall the syntax and semantics of temporal logics and how temporal modalities are defined using MLO truth tables.
Temporal logics and modalities
The syntax of Temporal Logic (TL) has in its vocabulary a set of variables (sometimes called propositional names) and a set B of modality names (sometimes called ''temporal connectives'' or ''temporal operators'') with prescribed arity
. . } (we usually omit the arity notation). The set of modality names B might be infinite. A temporal logic based on a set of modalities B is denoted TL(B); B is called the basis of TL(B). Atomic temporal formulae are just variables and other formulae are obtained from the atoms using Boolean connectives and applying the modalities. Formally, the syntax of TL(B) is given by the following grammar:
where P ranges over the variable names. The nesting-depth of a temporal formula φ, denoted by nd(φ), is defined as usual: nd(φ) = 0 for atomic formulae; nd(φ ∧ φ ) = max(nd(φ), nd(φ )); nd(¬φ) = nd(φ); and nd(#
Temporal formulae are interpreted over partially ordered sets with monadic predicates, in particular over computation trees and over labelled chains. Every modality # l is interpreted in every structure T as an operator
which assigns ''the set of points where # l (Q 1 , . . . , Q l ) holds'' to the l-tuple Q 1 , . . . , Q l . (Here P is the power set notation, and P (|T |) denotes the set of all subsets of the universe of T .)
Formally, we define when a temporal formula φ holds in a node s of a structure T = |T |,
. . , written T , s |= φ, by the following inductive clauses:
The semantics of Boolean combinations is defined as usual, and (3) The semantics of modalities is defined by:
Notes.
(1) In temporal and modal logics, formulae are constructed from atoms by applying Boolean connectives and modalities.
Formalisms like MLO and µ-calculus can specify properties of trees. However, they use binding, quantifiers, fixed-points; hence, they are not temporal logics according to our definition. (2) Strictly speaking, what we call temporal logic is called one-dimensional temporal logic. The syntax of k-dimensional temporal logic is the same as that of one-dimensional temporal logic. However, atomic formulae (variables) are interpreted as k-ary relations; accordingly, every l-place modality # l is interpreted in every structure T as an operator which assigns a k-ary relation (over |T |) to every l-tuple of k-ary relations [11] .
For a class C of computation trees, we say that two temporal formulae φ 1 and φ 2 are equivalent over C, written φ 1 ≡ C φ 2 , when T , s |= φ 1 iff T , s |= φ 2 for all T ∈ C and s ∈ |T |. Given two temporal logics TL 1 and TL 2 , we say that TL 1 is as expressive as TL 2 over C, written TL 2 ≤ C TL 1 , when every formula φ 2 in TL 2 has a C-equivalent formula in TL 1 . When both TL 1 ≤ C TL 2 and TL 2 ≤ C TL 1 hold, we say that the two logics are expressively equivalent over C, written TL 1 ≡ C TL 2 . We usually omit mentioning C when we consider the class of all computation trees.
When a TL 1 formula φ is equivalent to some TL 2 formula φ , we say that φ can be expressed in TL 2 . If φ has the form H(P 1 , . . . , P l ), we say that the modality H can be expressed in TL 2 .
We say that a temporal logic L has (or admits) a finite basis if there is a finite set of modalities
Truth tables
There is not much interest in a modality # whose interpretation is arbitrary and is defined ad hoc in each and every structure where the temporal logic is to be interpreted. To be of interest a modality needs to have a uniform description in some metalanguage that connects the set of points where #(φ 1 , . . . , φ k ) holds to the sets of points where each of the φ i holds. It is an empirical fact that all the temporal modalities considered in the literature are defined in MLO in the following way: for every l-place modality # there is a formula#(x 0 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X l ) of MLO with one free first-order variable x 0 and l set variables, such that for every structure T and subsets R i ⊆ |T |:
The formula# will be called the truth table of this modality # T . Let M be a temporal modality defined by a formula φ M ∈ MLO serving as a truth table. We say that M has the quantifier-depth k if qd(φ M ) = k.
Example 3.1 (Some Common Modalities and their Truth Tables).
• The one-place modality F (''eventually''); its truth table is
• The one-place modality X (''next''); its truth table is
• The two-place modality U (''until''); its truth table is
In the literature a ''nonstrict'' definition of Until is sometimes given: the ''nonstrict until'' U ns modality has the truth table
Clearly, U ns can be defined using U:
• The one-place modality F ∞ (''infinitely often''); its truth table is
Note that this formula expresses ''X occurs infinitely often'' on the natural numbers' flow, not on reals. For the reals there is another truth table which expresses ''infinitely often''.
• The two-place modality S (''since''); its truth table is
The choice of the particular modalities with their truth tables determines the different temporal logics. Most of the temporal logics studied in Computer Science use only modalities having truth tables definable by future MLO formulae (see Definition 2.1).
Definition 3.2 (First-Order Future Modality).
A temporal modality M is a first-order future modality if its truth table is a future formula of FOMLO.
Second-order future modalities are defined similarly. The modalities defined in the above example F, G, X, U and F ∞ are first-order future modalities; the modality S is not a future modality.
The rest of this section is not needed for the proof of our main results. However, it is needed for the statement of the consequences of the main results and for comparison with related works.
For reasoning about the branching structure of computation trees, so-called branching-time temporal logics have been introduced, with CTL and CTL * as main representatives. These temporal logics use special modalities whose truth tables start with a path quantifier, as we now explain.
Definition 3.3 (Path Modalities).
For every first-order future formula φ(x 0 , X 1 , . . . , X l ), we define an l-place path modality Eφ as follows:
T , a |= Eφ if and only if there is a path π from a in T , such that
The modality Eφ is said to be the path modality which corresponds to φ(x 0 , X 1 , . . . , X l ). (2) CTL * is the temporal logic with modalities Eψ , where ψ is a TL(U) formula. CTL * is expressively equivalent to the temporal logic defined as TL(B), where
Note that the standard definition of CTL * [9] uses an interplay between state formulae (which correspond to genuine modalities) and path formulae (which play an auxiliary role) in order to generate infinitely many modalities by a finite syntax. However, the standard CTL * is expressively equivalent to the temporal logic defined above [7, 23] .
(3) For k = 1, 2, . . ., BTL k is the temporal logic defined as TL(B k ), where 
Main results
Let M k (X 1 , . . . , X k ) be the modality such that T , s |= M k (X 1 , . . . , X k ) iff there is a path from s such that for every I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} the formula i∈I X i ∧ j ∈I ¬X j is satisfied infinitely often along this path. It is clear that M r+1 (X 1 , . . . , X r+1 ) has a truth table in MLO; it is also definable in CTL * and even in ECTL + . Here we prove that if a temporal logic uses only modalities of arity at most r definable by future MLO formulae, then M r+1 (X 1 , . . . , X r+1 ) cannot be expressed in this temporal logic. Definition 4.1 (Logic TLAR k ). For every k ≥ 1, let TLAR k be the temporal logic based on all modalities of arity at most k defined by MLO future formulae. 1 Recall that T π is the substructure of T over the set of nodes π (see Section 2.3).
Lemma 4.2 (Main Lemma). For every k, the modality M k+1 is not expressible in TLAR k .
A top-down proof of the lemma is presented in Section 5.
The following consequences of the main lemma are immediate: 
Theorem 4.3 (Arity Hierarchy
Proof of Lemma 4.2
It will be convenient to represent trees by Kripke structures.
A Kripke structure is a structure M = |M|, R, P 1 , P 2 , . . . where |M| is a set of nodes, the P i are subsets of |M|, and R ⊆ |M| 2 is a binary transition relation. When (s, s ) ∈ R, we say that it is possible to move from s to s in one step. A path π in M starting from s 0 is a maximal sequence s 0 , s 1 , . . .
For our purposes, Kripke structures are mainly another way of presenting computation trees. Note that the transitions of type (1) 
Also observe that Below we study how TLAR r formulae are satisfied in M in order to prove that they cannot express M r+1 (X 1 , . . . , X r+1 ).
Let B be a finite set of modalities definable by future MLO formulae of arity r. 
The proof of the lemma is given in Section 5. 
Elements of composition method
Composition theorems are tools which reduce sentences about some compound structures to sentences about their parts. A seminal example of such a result is the Feferman-Vaught Theorem [10] which reduces the first-order theory of the generalized product to the first-order theory of its factors. Composition theorems for theories of orderings were first explored by Läuchli [18] , and subsequently developed by Shelah [27] . Shelah [27] used the composition theorem for linear orders as one of the main tools for obtaining very strong decidability results for the monadic theory of linear orders. The technique was used in a series of papers by Shelah (see, e.g., [14, 15, 19] ), and outlined in survey expositions by Gurevich [13] and Thomas [28] .
In this section definitions and lemmas which will be used later are collected. They are adaptations of more general results proved by Shelah [27] . The proofs of the theorems stated here can be easily extracted from the results in [27, 19] .
Given two computation trees T and T , we write T ≡ n T if no MLO sentence of quantifier-depth n can distinguish between these trees. Formally, T ≡ n T if and only if for any MLO sentence ϕ with qd(ϕ) ≤ n we have T |= ϕ iff T |= ϕ. Equally, we write (T , s) ≡ n (T , s ) if no MLO formula ϕ(x) with qd(ϕ) ≤ n can distinguish between these trees with specified nodes.
The relations ≡ n are clearly equivalence relations over trees and over trees with specified nodes and they enjoy the following important properties.
Lemma 5.5. Let Σ be a finite set of monadic predicate names.
(1) For each n, the relation ≡ n defines finitely many equivalence classes The proof of the above lemma is easy once you realize that there are only finitely many semantically-distinct formulae with at most one free variable of a fixed quantifier-depth n. This fact itself can be shown easily by induction on quantifier-depth.
Referring to Lemma 5.5, with n fixed, we can fix m as well as the equivalence classes T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m and sentences β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β m as given in the lemma. We then define the extended alphabet
Lemma 5.6 below states that in order to find to which ≡ n class a computation tree T belongs, it is enough to know the labels of the root and to which ≡ n equivalence classes the sons of the root belong.
Given a computation tree T , we denote by α(T ) the computation tree over Σ whose nodes are the root of T and its sons; the < relation in α(T ) is inherited from T , i.e, root T is the root of α(T ) and root T and root α(T ) have the same sons. Hence, the leaves of α(T ) are at level one.
The labelling of α(T ) is defined as follows: the root root α(T ) of α(T ) has the same label as the root of T and v = root α(T ) is labelled by i if the subtree of T rooted at v is in the equivalence class T i . The importance of α(T ) is that it captures the whole of T with respect to the distinguishing power of MLO formulae of quantifier-depth n. Lemma 5.6. For every n there is n B such that for every tree T and a tree T :
This lemma can be easily proved using Ehrenfeucht-Fraissé games. It is also a simple instance of Shelah's composition theorem for the generalized sum (see Theorems 2, 4 in [27] or Th 1.12 in [19] ).
Proof of Lemma 5.4
Let B be a finite set of future MLO modalities of arity at most r. Let n be an upper bound on the quantifier-depth of the truth tables for modalities in B. Let T i (i = 1, . . . , m) be the ≡ n equivalence classes and let β i (i = 1, . . . , m) be the corresponding characteristic sentences over monadic predicate names P 1 , . . . , P r . Letβ i (x 0 , X 1 , . . . , X r ) be formulae obtained by relativizing all first-order quantifiers of β i to ≥ x 0 and by replacing the predicate names P i by monadic variables X i (i = 1, . . . , r). From Lemma 5.5 and Remark 2.2 it follows that every modality in B has a truth table which is a (finite) disjunction of formulae from {β i : i = 1, . . . , m}. Hence, every formula in TL(B) is equivalent to a formula in TL({β i : i = 1, . . . , m}). Therefore, w.l.o.g., it is sufficient to prove Lemma 5.4 for the case when B = {β i : i = 1, . . . , m}.
The proof proceeds by induction over the structure of φ. The cases where φ is an atomic proposition, or a Boolean combination of subformulae are obvious. The only interesting case is the case when φ =β(φ 1 , . . . , φ r ), whereβ is modality and φ 1 , . . . , φ r are formulae.
For i = 1, . . . , r let P i be the set of nodes in M that satisfy φ i . Let M be the Kripke structure with the same nodes as M, the same accessibility relations as M and with r unary predicates P 1 , . . . , P r .
Let T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m be the ≡ n equivalence classes of computational trees with r monadic predicates. Let F = {i : there is q, ∆, l, j such that ∆ = ∆ 0 and the tree obtained by unfolding M from q, ∆, l, j is in
. . , r) and if i ∈ F then there is q , ∆ , l , j such that ∆ = ∆ 0 and the level l < k φ and the tree obtained by unfolding M from q , ∆ , l , j is in T i . Note that k φ exists because F and B are finite sets.
First we show that
Let T (respectively, T ) be the tree obtained by unfolding M from q, ∆, l, j (respectively, from q, ∆ , l , j ). Since l, l ≥ k φ , from the definition of M it follows that for every i ∈ F both the root of T and the root of T have infinitely many sons in the ≡ n equivalence class T i . For every i ∈ F neither the root of T nor the root of T have a son in T i . By the inductive assertion M, q, ∆, l, j |= φ i iff M, q, ∆ , l , j |= φ i for i = 1, . . . , r. Therefore, the roots of T and of T have the same labels. Hence, α(T ) is isomorphic to α(T ) and by Lemma 5.6 we obtain that T ≡ n T . This implies (A) because φ =β(φ 1 , . . . , φ r ) andβ is a future MLO modality of quantifier-depth at most n.
For every q ∈ ∆ (respectively, q ∈ ∆ ) the tree obtained by unfolding M from q, ∆ 0 , l, j is isomorphic to the tree obtained by unfolding M from q, ∆ , l, j (respectively, from q, ∆ , l, j ). Therefore, for every q ∈ ∆ (respectively,
). This together with (A) and the definition of
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Conclusion and related results
The paper concerns the expressive power of temporal logics over trees. Our main result states: for every n, there is an n-ary modality M n that is not equivalent over trees to any temporal formula built over modalities of arity strictly less than n. Its proof takes advantage of an instance of Shelah's composition theorem. Besides, this result has interesting corollaries for instance reproving the known facts that CTL * and ECTL + have no finite basis.
The modality M k (X 1 , . . . , X k ) expresses a ''natural fairness property'': M k (X 1 , . . . , X k ) holds at s iff there is a path from s such that for every I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} the formula i∈I X i ∧ j ∈I ¬X j is satisfied infinitely often along this path.
As one of the consequences of the main lemma, we obtained the arity hierarchy for the temporal logics with the modalities definable by future MLO formulae -Theorem 4.3.
The main lemma also implies that neither CTL * nor ECTL + has finite base. Regarding CTL * , it was shown that its expressive power cannot be captured by a finite set of modalities, thus providing a partial explanation of why there is no general agreement as to what should be the preferred set of modalities for branchingtime logics [22, 23] . In [23] , we introduced a sequence BTL 1 , BTL 2 , . . . of temporal logics where BTL k has the modalities Eφ for any FOMLO formula φ of quantifier-depth at most k (see Example 3.4(3)) and showed that there exists an infinite hierarchy (w.r.t. expressive power) among BTL 1 , BTL 2 , . . .. Since CTL * is exactly as expressive as BTL def = k BTL k , and since any CTL * modality is a BTL k modality for some k, the existence of an infinite hierarchy among {BTL k } k=1,2,... entails that CTL * has no finite basis. Note that for every k > 1, the modalities M r+1 (X 1 , . . . , X r+1 ) are in BTL k . Therefore, by Corollary 1(2), for k > 1 there is no finite base for BTL k .
In [24] it was proved that ECTL + has no finite basis. The modalities EM l were introduced for a kind of fairness constraint:
EM l (X 1 , . . . , X l ) states that there is a path along which every X i is satisfied infinitely often and where only the nodes satisfying some of the X i s are encountered. In [24] , the proof that ECTL + has no finite base was derived from the following results:
(1) the temporal logics ECTL + and BTL 2 and TL(EU, {EM l } l=1,2,... ) are expressively equivalent and (2) for all k ∈ N the logic TL(EU, {EM 1 , . . . , EM k }) is strictly less expressive than TL(EU, {EM 1 , . . . , EM k , EM k+1 }).
The construction of a Kripke structure that witnesses the lack of expressive power stated in our main result is strongly inspired from a similar construction in [24] (cf. Sect. 5.1) and the n-ary modality M n used to prove the main result is a variant of a modality EM n .
Our main lemma is much stronger than (2). Our proof is quite different from the proof in [24] and requires the replacement of a simple induction by more subtle arguments based on the composition method.
In our proof we used trees with infinite branching. However, this is not essential. The proof can be easily modified to show that M r+1 is not expressible in TLAR r over the class of trees with finite branching.
Let us conclude with some open questions:
Arity Hierarchy over finite trees: Is TLAR r less expressive than TLAR r+1 over the class of finite trees?
Note that over the class of finite trees M r (X 1 , . . . , X r ) is equivalent to false; hence, it cannot distinguish between TLAR r and TLAR r+1 . The results of [25, 26] imply that any future first-order MLO formula is equivalent to a TL(U, {D n X } n=1.2... ) formula, where D n X are counting modalities; D n X holds at t if X holds for (at least) n>0 different successors of t. Therefore, every modality definable by a future first-order MLO formula is equivalent to a TLAR 2 formula and cannot be used to show that the logics {TLAR r : r ∈ N} form a hierarchy.
Arity Hierarchy over ω: Is TLAR r less expressive than TLAR r+1 over the class of ω-chains?
Note that over the class of ω-chains M r (X 1 , . . . , X r ) is equivalent to a future first-order MLO formula. By the Kamp theorem every future first-order MLO formula is equivalent to a TL(U) formula, and therefore, it cannot be used to show that the logics {TLAR r : r ∈ N} form a hierarchy. In [1] , it was shown that there is no finite base temporal logic which has the same expressive power as the MLO. However, the separation lemma in this proof used modalities of arity one.
In our proof it was essential that we only deal with modalities definable by future MLO formulae. We believe that our results can be extended to modalities definable by arbitrary MLO formulae. In particular, we conjecture that M r+1 (X 1 , . . . , X r+1 ) cannot be expressed in any temporal logic with modalities of arity at most r definable by MLO formulae (not necessarily future ones).
